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Abstract
The rapid miniaturization and integration of sensor technologies into mobile Internet devices com-
bined with Online Social Networks allows for enhanced sensor information querying, subscription,
and task placement within People-Centric Sensing networks. However, PCS systems which ex-
ploit knowledge about OSN user profiles and context information for enhanced service provision
might cause an unsolicited application and dissemination of highly personal and sensitive data.
In this paper, we propose a protocol extension to our OSN design Vegas which enables secure,
privacy-preserving, and trustful P2P communication between PCS participants. By securing
knowledge about social links with standard public key cryptography, we achieve a degree of
anonymity at a trust level which is almost good as that provided by a centralized trusted third
party.
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1 Introduction
The increasing spread of powerful mobile Internet devices like smartphones or tablets,
accompanied by their rich set of integrated sensing facilities, already allow for numerous
mobile and context-enriched applications. Induced by those technical innovations, People-
Centric Sensing (PCS), a recently emerging research area in the field of Wireless Sensor
Networks, attracts increasing attention. PCS focuses on the collection of user-generated
sensor data as well as its application-oriented aggregation and utilization at Internet-scale.
In contrast to traditional sensor networks, PCS heavily builds on sensor information which
is generated by a user’s personal sensing environment [3, 5, 7]. Triggered by the rocketing
number of Online Social Network (OSN) users and the imminent integration of several mobile
sensor devices into personal sensing environments, recent research attempts to combine PCS
environments and OSNs [1, 8]. Knowledge derived from social graphs and OSN user profile
information can significantly improve the process of sensor information querying, sensor data
subscription, and sensor task placement.
A well-known problem of PCS environments and sensor data context information gen-
eration emerges from the insufficient compliance with user privacy and security demands.
Prevailing concerns stem from the possibility that any other subscriber could infer user profiles
from continuous tracking information in order to e.g. perform unsolicited advertisement or
even personal attacks. Despite recent efforts to incorporate privacy and security features into
PCS systems [3, 5, 7] and OSNs [2, 4], present architectures still do not provide adequate
precautions to fulfill all related privacy and security demands. On the one hand, experiences
from the operation of location-based services have shown that a widespread utilization of
such systems suffers from inadequate anonymization. The same problem arises in association
with PCS networks as users contribute sensing data comprising personal information which
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must not be publicly available. On the other hand, integrity of sensor data originating
from PCS networks must be guaranteed. At present, the only possibility considered secure
consists in the application of a trusted third party for the generation and assignment of
public key certificates for each PCS network participant. However, a trusted third party
cannot guarantee user anonymity as there is at least one party which is able to map users,
their messages, and their content to one and the same identity.
In order to avoid the need for a trusted third party, we consider a protocol extension
for our P2P-based OSN architecture Vegas which allows for secure and privacy-preserving
information querying inside PCS networks.
In the remainder of this paper section 2 gives a short overview of Vegas and details the
proposed protocol extension. Section 3 discusses our extension focusing on performance,
privacy, and security aspects. Work which is closely related to our approach is presented in
section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 System Architecture
In the following, we review parts of our OSN architecture developed in previous work before
we present our P2P-based overlay query routing extension which allows for privacy-preserving
sensor task, subscription, and query distribution.
2.1 Vegas Design Principles
Our proposed P2P design Vegas builds on an architecture currently developed at the Ludwig-
Maximilians-University Munich. The architecture focuses on privacy and security aspects
within a P2P-based OSN. Vegas complies with a set of requirements that we consider
inevitable for a secure and privacy preserving OSN. These requirements encompass a user’s
informational self-determination, strong trust relationships between friends, anywhere and
anytime profile availability, and transparent mobility support [6].
Vegas represents a highly restrictive OSN as it does not support communication between
participants that are not directly connected by an edge of the underlying social graph. This
restriction is motivated by a problem we termed social network pollution. To give but a few
examples of social network pollution, present OSNs offer the possibility for search operations
on its social graphs, provide unsolicited friendship recommendations, and offer support for
non-authorized linkage of a friend’s friends. This leads to a multitude of unwanted friendship
establishments i.e. links in the social graph which not necessarily represent a real friendship.
Although this design choice disallows some appealing and beneficial applications, we consider
this fact as an acceptable trade-off in order to guarantee a high degree of privacy and security.
2.2 Vegas Operation
In a nutshell, Vegas functions as follows: Any two users A and B who maintain a friendship
in Vegas own a public key pair i.e. a link-specific key pair for each other. As user A holds a
unique key pair K−A→Xi/K
+
A→Xi(i ∈ 1, . . . , n) for each of his n friends X1, ..., Xn, a key pair
represents nothing else than a directed edge in the overall social graph. For the remainder
of this paper, we always mean link-specific keys when we talk about keys and key pairs.
The notion of a key K [−|+]A→B means that this key is a private/public key generated by A
for exclusive communication with B. A utilizes B’s public key K+B→A to encrypt messages
intended for B. In addition, A’s public key K+A→B is included into each message in order to
map the originator of a message to its content. It should be stressed that, for the purpose
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of signing, the application of A’s private key K−A→B is restricted to messages addressed to
B. Since a key pair represents an edge of the social graph, removal of such an edge – which
equals to the cancellation of a friendship – is performed by the deletion of the matching key
pair. This allows for easy key revocation as the application of keys is limited to two friends.
In order to allow for delay-tolerant oﬄine communication, we build on an asynchronous
message exchange scheme based on a concept presented in [13]. Vegas relies on well known
services like email, SMS, or instant messaging which can be exploited to simulate the
exchanger component. An exchanger represents the abstract concept of a message queue
which may be used to transmit messages or any other kind of content. Any two Vegas friends
A and B are aware of one or more such exchanger addresses of each other. In case A wants
to send a message to B, A applies B’s public key K+B→A to encrypt the message content.
After signing the message with K−A→B , A sends this message to one of B’s exchangers. Now
B can fetch this messages and identify sender A through his attached public key. It should
be stressed that B is the only user that knows about the mapping of the included public key
to the identity of user A. In case A considers the mapping of a public key to B’s identity
to be compromised, A can trigger a key refresh operation in order to replace all former key
pairs shared with B.
2.3 Vegas Extension for Sensor Querying
Vegas represents a highly restrictive P2P OSN as it disallows communication between users
that do not share an edge in the underlying social graph. Since P2P-based PCS applications
require multi-hop (i.e multi-edge) communication we developed a protocol extension which
allows for the application of Vegas for highly anonymous and trustful sensor information
communication. In this paper we focus on the utilization of Vegas for sensor querying i.e.
we provide an answer to the question how to figure out one or more OSN users that a)
support the discovery of sensor information, b) allow for sensor subscription, and c) facilitate
sensor task placement. Figure 1 illustrates this forwarding process in detail. Information
from the OSN domain gives access to all properties and preferences from all OSN users that
represent a friend. For instance, in case a user A wants to figure out other OSN users which
could support querying sensor-related information, A can issue a sensor query to friends
X1, . . . , Xm (1 ≤ m ≤ n, n denotes the total number of A’s friends) whose profiles match A’s
query content. Dependent on the kind of available sensors and user defined access policies
a user Xi (i ∈ 1, . . . ,m) can respond to such a sensor query. To benefit from Xi’s social
relationships, we introduce a mechanism which allows for trusted and privacy-preserving
forwarding of queries to users that do not share an edge with the query originator. Queries are
tuples of the form (operation, sensing properties, task properties). An example
query for measuring the temperature in a certain area might look like this:
Q(i) = (put_task,(type=temp,frequency=1),(location={x,y},radius=r,time={t1,t2}))
At first, A attempts to locally match all profiles of his friends with the constraints of request
Q(i). Considering the request Q(i) a matchmaking process could be based on one or more
heuristics that operate on the properties location and time. This restricts positive matches to
users who not only support the requested sensor type and its properties but also visit places
close to the provided location with a certain frequency and during certain periods of time.
Since we do not limit requests to a predefined set of properties it could also be necessary to
apply reasoning operations to reduce/increase the set of positive matches. After A finished
the refinement process, he sends a request message Q(i) to all friends Xi (i ∈ 1, . . . ,m) whose
profiles indicated a match. This message includes an exchanger addresses of A. A recipient,
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Figure 1 Schematic illustration of a query routing path. Messages are labeled with the corre-
sponding exchanger utilized for transmission. Sending a message via exchanger Ti includes message
encryption and signing with the corresponding key pairs.
in this example Xi1, who does not fulfill the requirements of Q(i) may decide to forward
the query to all his friends whose profiles indicate a potential match for Q(i). The decision
whether to respond and forward a query depends on user preferences (either set by policies
or manual interaction). This process repeats until Q(i) cannot be forwarded any longer or
arrives at user Z who is able to setup the specified task. As we attach an exchanger address
and a temporary public key of sender A to Q(i), Z can send an encrypted response R(i) to
A notifying him about a successful task setup. Due to our privacy demands, we enable Z
to anonymize his identity by relying R(i) via one of his randomly selected friends Yj1. To
increase the degree of anonymity, we allow for a dynamic configuration of the number of
edges R(i) has to traverse before it may reach the originator of the request. Dependent on
the degree of anonymity, Yj1 does not directly respond to A but randomly selects one of his
friends Yj2 as the next relay, and so far. Therefore, even multiple, successive responses are
not delivered by the same user concealing a relation among those messages.
3 Discussion
Our approach represents a trade-off between support for efficient query routing inside PCS
networks and the assurance of a high degree of anonymity and trust. This section provides
some considerations regarding these aspects.
3.1 Routing Aspects
P2P networks can be separated into structured and unstructured systems. While unstructured
systems suffer from query routing inefficiency due to their flooding approach, structured
networks are susceptible to churn. The idea to infer query routing paths from OSN user
profile information has recently been proposed for Pastry [10]. Our approach does not utilize
the concept of DHTs but allows for simple forwarding based on preferences and capabilities
of OSN participants. In essence, our design represents a trade-off since the application of
OSN knowledge is expected to perform better than flooding but worse than DHT-based
query routing. It should be mentioned that our proposed extension focuses on delay-tolerant
networks. Although one could imagine scenarios which suffer from such a best effort approach,
an asynchronous implementation is motivated by our demand for a high degree of anonymity
and trust. In addition, this restriction can help to obtain a larger result set as users can
forward requests even in case a recipient is currently oﬄine.
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3.2 Privacy Aspects
Although Vegas profiles are publicly available, by default, they are always encrypted with a
friend’s link-specific public key. Furthermore, all messages sent between two friends A and B
are encrypted based on the corresponding public key. As long as direct messaging is limited
to friends, Vegas adheres to all requirements listed in [6]. The proposed query extension
for Vegas introduces a routing process which involves OSN users that do not share an edge
with the query originator. However, our stringent privacy requirements are still fulfilled:
Considering the query path of a sensor information request, the only information disclosed
by the originator is one of probably multiple exchanger addresses. Dependent on the desired
degree of anonymity, a sensing node may decide on the number of utilized exchangers as well
as the frequency for exchanger refreshes. To increase the anonymity of a responding user,
our extension allows him to specify the minimum number of edges a message has to pass
before it can arrive at the originator of the request. Certainly, our extension cannot guard
against protocol attacks like routing, storage, sybil, and eclipse attacks that all structured
P2P networks suffer from. For instance, it takes no effort to replace an exchanger address to
forward responses to another user. However, assuming trustful friendships, our extension
cannot be exploited for security attacks targeting at message integrity or disclosure of user
identities.
3.3 Trust Aspects
Vegas does not support unsolicited friendship establishment. Due to the introduction of
multi-edge query routing, this stringent restriction becomes relaxed as private information
disseminates over the boundary of the personal friendship domain. However, even in case
a user observes hostile behavior of his friends, it necessitates a simple key pair deletion to
cancel any association with such a friend. The degree of trust achieved by our design is
not equivalent to that offered by a single trusted third party. However, compared to the
application of a web of trust solution, our extension allows for much better trust relations
between users that do not share an edge in the social graph. In summary, our trust model
must be considered as a serious alternative to a trusted third party solution as it achieves
complete informational self-determination in a decentralized way.
4 Related Work
A lot of research has been published with concepts focusing on privacy, security, and integrity
aspects in PCS networks. The key idea of PriSense [11] is to slice data and send it via
several different nodes, instead of sending it at once and directly to a server. Thereby, it
conceals the data sensed by the individual users; however, it is still known which users
participated. Our solution conceals the identities of participating users to allow for a real
anonymous participation. Another approach is to add noise to sensed data, which can be
subtracted in a later stage. In PoolView [7] measured time-series data is superimposed with
a noise model, which is shared within the community. It preserves recently sensed values
as well as their changes with time. Instead of perturbing measurements, AnonySense [3]
employs several anonymization components, such as Tor and MIX networks, to obscure a
user’s identity. k-anonymity is ensured through a registration authority. An orthogonal
approach is to actively engage users to decide on what to reveal to whom, and to learn what
kind of data can be shared without compromising the user’s privacy [12]. However, this
concept simply retains sensitive data which results in a smaller amount of useful information.
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Due to our fully anonymous communication, our solution also allows for sharing of sensitive
data. An important research field represents privacy protection in OSNs. Some related
work already proposes the application of P2P concepts to allow for privacy-preserving social
networking [4, 2]. OSNs have also been combined with PCS networks but merely to enable
new applications [8, 9] and not to enhance privacy. To the best of our knowledge, our
approach is the first that uses an OSN to ensure privacy and trust in PCS networks.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We proposed a protocol extension to our OSN design Vegas which achieves a high degree
of anonymity and trust for delay-tolerant PCS networks. Our solution does not rely on a
trusted third party but achieves trust by exploiting knowledge about the social graph. As
our extension circumvents the spread of social network pollution and therefore complies with
our requirement for perfect informational self-determination, we achieve a higher degree of
trust than with a decentralized solution like the web of trust. In our future work we intend
to perform several user studies to gain knowledge about the applicability of our approach
in real world settings. In parallel, we will conduct intense simulations of typical protocol
attacks identify the requirements for important system parameters like the minimum number
of friends necessary to achieve a sufficient degree of anonymity and trust.
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